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Introduction 
The problem 
This paper emerged from a renewed engagement with interview data gathered as part 
of a larger project involving preteen girls and boys (n=13) with a diagnosed eating 
disorder, and their mothers (n=13). By the time we came to analyse the data for this 
paper, the project had already yielded a number of articles (e.g. Author B and others, 
2013; Author B and others, 2014; Author C and others, 2014). The analysis that 
generated the previous papers had adopted a feminist post-structuralist 
epistemological framework, and utilised established tools of qualitative inquiry 
including semi-structured interviews, transcribing, coding and thematic clustering, 
immersion, critical data analysis and reflection.  
We then turned our gaze to examine how these boys and girls engaged with 
discourses of health, food, bodies and appearance. We wondered whether this cohort 
had any ‘interesting’ or ‘significant’ things to say about food, health, body image, and 
the operations of bio-pedagogies (Author C and other, 2009) that might reveal 
similarities or differences in relation to gender, subjectivity, socialisation, or 
schooling, given that both home and school contexts were recognised as likely sites 
where these processes were embodied and enacted. 
We began by seeking out connections, patterns, themes, threads of continuity, points 
of contrast, hints of explanation, or hooks to various theoretical perspectives and other 
discourses in the data. Initially we were interested in a gender comparison but the data 
revealed little of significance or note. We had hoped that the relative dearth of 
existing literature on preteen girls and boys with eating disorders, coupled with the 
rigour we had maintained throughout the process of data analysis, might have exposed 
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a gap that we could inhabit in some insightful ways. Yet the closer we looked at the 
data, and the more we resolved to find some hidden worthwhile meaning(s), the less 
we actually ‘saw’ of any ‘real’, or obvious significance. While certain isolated 
comments made by the children aroused a mild interest, they did not establish any 
themes or patterns that we could expand into meaningful analysis or discussion. We 
had come to accept that the transcript data related to the children’s comments on 
health and body discourse had nothing further to yield, given our established methods 
and epistemological lenses. We were prepared to settle with this absence of 
significance, yet it continued to cause a mild irritation in us, like a bone in the throat. 
As MacLure (2006) pointed out, the bone caught in the throat cannot be easily ‘spat 
out or swallowed. It is [therefore] a hopeful figure for a productively irritating 
method’ (p. 731).   
At this point we started to consider some tangential ways of thinking about our 
problem, or whether there might be some other productively irritating method we 
could deploy. The children had all been willing participants and generally 
forthcoming during interviews. We wondered, however, whether or not the data might 
have been successfully resisting our efforts to decode, unravel, and make them 
meaningful, in the same way that silence has been recognised as a form of resistance 
to analysis (MacLure, Holmes, Jones and MacRae, 2010). Our ways of seeing and 
attempting to understand the data were confounded, and the transcript data on which 
we had fixed our gaze were proving recalcitrant. 
Having outlined our initial problem and the impasse that we had reached, we now 
present this paper in three discrete yet overlapping sections. First we outline the 
theoretical ideas that led to the jettisoning of our established epistemological 
framework and methodology. We then demonstrate how we applied this different way 
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of thinking and analysing to fragments of our data set. Finally, we elaborate the 
implications of this approach in our discussion and continuing thoughts. 
 
Methodological Reorientation and Epistemological Shift 
In an attempt to clear the metaphorical bone from our methodological throats, we 
were jolted across to some of the innovations that have taken place recently within 
qualitative research (e.g. Jackson and Mazzei, 2012; Lenz Taguchi, 2012; MacLure, 
2006, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Mazzei, 2013; Coleman and Ringrose, 2013). One 
of the key devices we utilised derived from MacLure’s (2006) conceptualisation of 
baroque method which intentionally ‘resist[s] clarity, mastery, and the single point of 
view, be[ing] radically uncertain about scale, boundaries and coherence’ (p. 731), 
favouring interruption and inconclusion over consistency and certainty. Such an 
approach seeks to unsettle ‘clear distinctions between subject and object’ whereby 
‘objects are allowed to manifest their intransigent thingness or “objectity” in the face 
of the rule- or pattern-seeking propensities of conventional social science’ (p. 734). 
The baroque approach encourages an ‘obstructive potential’ (p. 731) to come into 
productive play against more established social science methodologies, paving the 
way for different possibilities generated by other means. 
The cabinet of curiosities was the baroque exemplar (MacLure, 2006, 2013c) we 
appropriated in our attempt to move beyond the impasse and onto more fertile ground 
for re-viewing the data. In the actual cabinets of late 16th and early 17th century 
Europe, ‘contents were by no means “transparent displays” open to the masterful gaze 
of a detached observer’ (MacLure, 2006: 737). MacLure explains further, 
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Their contents were concealed in nested drawers, shelves, niches and boxes, 
behind internal doors, frames and partitions. These contents often included 
devices that distorted or played with reality: lenses, mirrors, optical games, 
paintings and clockwork automata. Thus the cabinets played with 
representation and reality—nesting one representation within another, 
producing doubles and deferral, putting reality into suspension (p. 737).   
The whole process of viewing the displays in the cabinet is relevant here, the different 
ways in which doors opened and closed, revealing artefacts from different 
perspectives, and within different timeframes. The cumulative effect was one of 
intensification and exhilaration that ‘sets perception, cognition and imagination in 
motion’ (p. 737). We were careful not to import the details of the actual historical 
cabinet too literally into a new methodological template, being mindful too of 
Deleuze’s movement cautionary notes on metaphors in the literary context, given 
their capacities can tempt, force, and limit meaning (Marks 1997). Nevertheless, 
MacLure’s (2006) conceptualisation and explanation usefully disturbed the habitual 
analytic modes and lenses with which we had been viewing the data. The disturbance 
invited us to recognise more the odd, off-centre, recessed, and oblique ways in which 
different comments made by the cohort of children with eating disorders sat near, or 
in relation to each other, while also presenting differently to us. This fresh 
methodological endeavour could potentially provide us with a way to loosen up the 
resistance within the data. 
We thus began to re-think our way of searching this data, or to re-search our way of 
thinking about the young people in our study. We began to retreat (ie recede) from 
our engagement with the process, and to take a break (ie recess) from our established 
connections with the data. This then allowed us to look deeper into, and differently at, 
 6 
the data until they suggested some fresh angles from which they could be viewed, 
perhaps becoming more fully or differently revealed in the process. 
The revised process prompted us to give closer consideration to some of the recent 
developments in feminist epistemology (e.g. Barad, 2007; Grosz, 2010; Lather, 2013; 
Lykke, 2010); Deleuzean approaches to qualitative and educational research (Jackson 
and Mazzei, 2012; Lenz Taguchi 2010, 2012) and post-foundationalism (MacLure, 
2006; Taylor and Ivinson, 2013). These ideas could provide new theoretical support 
for our engagement with the data, while simultaneously disturbing our habitual ways 
of analysing and making sense of interview data. Notions of diffraction, 
entanglement, becoming, and mattering assumed more active and central importance, 
as will be made evident in the remainder of this paper. As our curiosity fuelled our 
thinking, fragments of interview transcripts sitting in various recesses of the 
metaphorical cabinet of our inquiry, began looking back at us, also curious, 
wondering, and coaxing.  Seeking ways for the data to become more of ‘a constitutive 
force, working upon the researcher [potentially] as much as the researcher works upon 
the data (Hultman and Lenz Taguchi, 2010: 527), we began to look differently into 
our cabinet of data curiosities. This left us with a ‘shaky poise at the threshold of the 
unknown’ (MacLure, 2006: 737).   
The threshold arrives when the limits of knowing, or particular ways of knowing, are 
reached (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). An inability to make any special sense of the 
interview transcript data fragments took us to the limits of our ways of analysing data 
and generating any new knowledge as feminist post-structuralist researchers. This 
opened the data to mattering in new ways, especially certain turns of phrase that were 
uttered spontaneously by some of the preteen boys and girls with eating disorders 
during the interviews. The fact that we had hitherto been confounded by these 
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utterances became the very prompt we needed to become, like Alice in her 
Wonderland adventures, ‘curiouser and curiouser’ (Carroll, 1983: 33).  
Two further ideas fuelled our curiosity through this process. The first related to 
Barad’s (2007) notion of meaning as being entangled with all other matter, operating 
through the materio-discursive aspect of language. For Barad, “Discursive practices 
and material phenomena do not stand in a relationship of externality to each other; 
rather, the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in the dynamics of 
intra-activity’ (p.152, italics in original). This assumed special significance in relation 
to the interview data fragments. Barad invited us to engage with the idea that the 
words spoken by the children (and the interviewer) were not, therefore, ‘a property of 
individual words or groups of words but an ongoing performance of the world in its 
differential dance of intelligibility and unintelligibility’ (p.149). This allowed us to 
reconsider how the ‘matter’ of what the children said, could come to matter 
differently in terms of its meaning for us.  
The second idea re-shaping our thinking came from Deleuze’s concept of the ‘event’ 
and how this could be related to the interview process. For Deleuze, events are, 
expressed by means of language, in statements, but they are attributes of 
bodies and physical states of affairs…On this account, events are the 
epiphenomena of corporeal causal interactions: they do not affect bodies and 
states of affairs but they do affect other events, such as the responses and 
actions of agents. Pure events are both the expressed of statements and the 
'sense' of what happens (Patton 1997, np). 
In our (re) engagement with the interview data, we attempted to ascribe more 
embodied physicality to the children and what they expressed. We also sought to 
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allow the statements of the children to affect our responses in order to glean better, or 
differently, the ‘sense’ of what had been said. 
 
Curiously re-engaging with the data 
When asked the standard question to describe what an unhealthy body looked like, 
Maddy [aged 10] replied: 
‘Maybe someone who eats too much, or someone who eats too little, or someone 
who’s really depressed.’ 
While our question placed an implicit emphasis on the physical body, Maddy offered 
a response that challenged, or confounded, this assumption. This response caught our 
attention, fuelled our curiosity, and suggested that we needed to rethink our own 
formulations. Maddy’s comments about body size eschewed the common physical 
descriptors of appearance such as fat, thin, obese, overweight, skinny, anorexic and 
couch potato. Instead, Maddy focused on the process of eating, and the volume of 
food consumed, giving agency both to the person eating, but also to the matter of food 
itself as a possible source of depression. Maddy’s emphasis on process and agency 
conjures a dynamic, fluid, and changing set of conditions pertaining to a healthy body 
and its appearance, different to a clinical construction of the body as static, defined, 
bounded and nominal. Despite, or perhaps even because of having a diagnosis of 
anorexia, Maddy acknowledged negative consequences associated with eating either 
too much or too little. We tentatively wondered or imagined (MacLure, 2006) 
whether there was some awareness in Maddy, that if one is able to eat enough in a 
sustained way, then one will be sustained in a healthy way, or perhaps endowed with 
greater healthiness.  
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Maddy described an unhealthy body as ‘someone who’s really depressed’. Again, 
there is agency and movement in the reference because a person doesn’t ‘have 
depression’ but rather, they ‘are depressed’. Someone who ‘is’ depressed has their 
entire being charged with this condition, compared to someone who has, somehow, 
either taken possession of depression, or had it delivered to them. Medical models 
construe depression as a mental health problem and individual pathology. By contrast, 
Maddy’s construction is ontological and opens up the potential for release, expansion, 
elevation and re-animation. These are the latent others of being depressed, perhaps 
tangled and concealed within the state of being. By allowing the pathological to 
dominate the ontological, we could have easily overlooked an important concern with 
the interior that Maddy’s comment points to. There is also more of an interior bias in 
Maddy’s comment, that is a concern for the way things are within the self, rather than 
how they physically appear.   
Maddy’s comment runs counter to many of the wider social discourses that focus on 
the exterior factors, for example what we do (e.g. eat), rather than how we feel. It also 
throws up an unwitting challenge to the conventional mind-body binary that 
underpins much of Western philosophy, the natural and social sciences, and everyday 
discourse.  Her conceptualisation of an unhealthy body unequivocally includes 
someone with a clinical, mental-emotional illness, such as depression. Thus, Maddy 
seemed (instinctively?) attuned to how mind and body intra-act, or engage intra-
actively (Barad, 2007; Lenz Taguchi, 2010, 2012). In doing so, her words echo Lenz 
Taguchi’s (2010) call to acknowledge how ‘somatic illnesses emerge from emotional 
events that will profoundly affect the body in different ways’ (p. 4).  
Freya’s [aged 11] response to the same question about an unhealthy body also blurred 
the mind-body binary. 
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‘And you need to look like you’re…being happy also helps with a health body, 
because it helps with how your emotions feel’. 
Like Maddy, Freya drew on the non-physical dimension to support a comment she 
was making about the body. Without hesitation or apology, Freya bound the feeling of 
happiness to the condition of physical healthiness. There are obvious claims of union, 
or indivisibility here, between mind/body, thought/feeling and action/sensation, that 
all look like sharing a singular envelope, or process of continuous enfolding (Deleuze, 
1993). For Freya, happiness is embodied or enfleshed, bodies can be happy, and 
emotions feel. There are intimations in Freya’s mingling of healthy bodies with 
emotions that point to the fluid interplay of agency and matter acting within an 
entwined, enveloped, or entangled experience that cannot be easily reduced to either 
the physical/sensational, nor just the mental/emotional (Barad, 2007). These curious 
turns of phrase (by Maddy and Freya) point to varied and multiple manifestations of 
what Merrell (2003) refers to as the ‘bodymind’, his attempt to account linguistically 
for the unruptured nature of experience.  
 
Breaking new ground 
Even with nothing more than a set of linguistic resources typical for their ages (9-12), 
the girls and boys with eating disorders in our study found occasions to let their 
bodyminds talk through language in slightly off-beat, curious, and intriguing ways. 
Other comments by Freya also attracted our attention. Following a series of 
consultations with, and adjusted meal plans from a dietician, Freya talked about 
becoming more and more confused in relation to eating, and less able to eat anything. 
Freya said the dietician had ‘twisted my brain’ and that further appointments were 
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required with the doctor who was ‘trying to untwist my brain from what she [the 
dietician] has taught me, because I listen and I drill that into my brain’. For Freya, the 
turmoil and confusion generated by a series of encounters with her dietician and 
doctor was captured in her experience of a ‘twisted brain’. The twisted brain reminds 
us of the arbitrary and problematic divisions of body/mind, and the mental/material, 
and how these can be subverted by children with atypical and surprising articulations 
of their lived and embodied experiences. Freya neither referred to her mind, nor her 
head, as being twisted or confused, images more familiar to us from colloquial 
speech. Even if Freya was slightly skewing a more familiar metaphor, she offered a 
potent image of a vital bodily organ literally tied tightly around itself, crippling its 
proprietor, and forcing a lurch towards another form of professional help to assist 
with its disentanglement. This assistance was obviously necessary for Freya but at the 
same time, her description clearly presented a bodymind, or thickened subjectivity 
(Juelskjaer, 2013) characterised by complex and multifaceted entanglements. 
 
From ‘twisted brain’ to other ‘stuff’ 
There are echoes of Freya’s twisted brain in the following exchange with Louis [aged 
12]: 
Interviewer:  ‘Well tell me, when did you start getting sick? 
Louis: ‘Like sick as in the brain or as in like underweight?’ 
Interviewer: ‘Oh well, that’s a good question. I don’t know which one I mean’. 
After acknowledging the merit of Louis’ question, our interviewer acknowledged she 
was unsure what the question meant. Nothing was made of this in the field notes, nor 
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in the early rounds of coding. Yet this exchange with Louis is important for a number 
of reasons, firstly because of the way he disturbed the usual interview pattern of 
question/answer by answering the question with another question. In doing so, Louis 
also disrupted the power relationship operating between the researcher/subject or 
adult/child, by inverting the roles. This assumption of a position of power by Louis, 
one that flummoxed the interviewer by catching her off guard, invited closer 
consideration. On the one hand, Louis’ question can be read as simply reproducing 
the classic mind (brain) - body (underweight) binary. On the other hand, Louis’ 
response disrupted the very same binary that appeared to have been operating, albeit 
unconsciously, in the researcher. It could be claimed that Louis’ answer/question 
hinted at what Barad (2007) refers to as ‘the inherent indeterminacy of bodily 
boundaries’ (p.157). This, in turn, created an impasse or obstacle in the researcher, 
who was nevertheless able to acknowledge the validity of Louis’ reply, and the 
instability of her initial question. Barad (2007) argues that the ‘deep significance of a 
diffractive pattern’ is the way it operates as a material practice for ‘making a 
difference, for topologically reconfiguring connections’ (p.381, italics in original). 
Louis’ reply can be seen as having such potential to destabilise the conventional 
mind/body binary, while also hinting at other possible (albeit unknown) 
reconfigurations. Such a diffractive gesture is typical for its ‘effects of interferences, 
where the original wave partly remains within the new after its transformation’ (Lenz 
Taguchi, 2012: 271).  
Louis’ answer also spells out very clearly his assumption that anorexia is a 
psychophysical phenomenon. This is not a contentious view. Various models for 
research into anorexia identify the complex combination of biological, mental, 
psycho-emotional and socio-cultural factors operating within each case. What is 
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interesting about Louis’ comment is the way it was spoken through him as a reminder 
to the interviewer, that mind and body are much more complexly entwined and 
entangled than is often assumed. Within a different, diffractive way of thinking, the 
comment then also spoke differently to those of us involved in looking at the data. We 
wondered whether, as researchers, we tended to focus too much on learning about our 
subjects, rather than learning from them, or through them, or with them?  
 
When commenting and reflecting on the impact of his eating disorder, Louis 
suggested that, ‘if you feel hungry then eat more; if you don’t feel hungry, or if your 
feel full, don’t eat more’. The logic here is disarmingly simple. It cuts across, and 
potentially undermines layers of complex individual and cultural history and 
discourse around food, health, eating and body image. The simplicity of the advice 
belies and conceals a greater profundity. Louis’ statement compels us to stop and 
think why and how it is that we, assuming there is enough food available, may have 
lost touch with our own instinctive appetite, or hunger drive.  Despite, or perhaps 
because of his experience of anorexia, Louis appears to be aware of this instinct in 
himself, and is able to articulate it unequivocally, 
‘Well I just say well, food is good, just don’t eat too much and remember, if you feel 
hungry have something, because what your gut tells you, you need to do.  Your gut is 
always right’.   
These comments could be read in several ways, while also conceding that Louis may 
have reproduced what he had heard and learnt from the discourses favoured by his 
expert team of doctors, nutritionists and other carers. From one angle, Louis 
suggested that our gut/stomach/digestive tract is the best guide for our appetite and 
patterns of food consumption. We eat when we feel hungry as we need to address that 
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sensation and satiate the urge. Looking/listening a little more sideways however, we 
could also see/hear Louis telling us that the gut is not just something we respond to, 
but also something that directs us and tells us what we need to do. Even if Louis’ 
comments about the gut are intended to be food-specific, they could also be allowed 
to reverberate in relation to other human behaviours. Bergson’s remark chimes in 
usefully here, reminding us that, ‘instinct alone can give the concrete feel of 
knowledge’ (cited in Reid, 1972: np). There are, therefore, epistemological 
implications and consequences in Louis’ statement. This is reinforced by his 
conviction that ‘your gut is always right’. There are even moral overtones here, 
evidenced by his direct statement about what is good and right. 
 
Following Louis’ advice to follow the gut and to eat only when either hungry or not 
already full of food, our interviewer responded with a rhetorical question, 
‘So listen to your body?’ to which Louis replied, 
‘Yes, and listen to your body, don’t listen to your person’. 
Initially, this exchange looked to contradict our analysis of the body and mind that 
tended to be artificially separated by language. However, is ‘listen [ing] to your body’ 
equivalent to ‘your gut is always right’? It is easy to slip into the binary trap and 
assume ‘gut equals body’, and this is the slip the interviewer appeared to make in her 
response. Louis chose to affirm the split imposed by the rhetorical question, but then 
instantly offered a point of difference/differentiation between ‘your body’ and ‘your 
person’. Without disputing or dismissing the encapsulation of his experience and 
learning as ‘listen to your body’, Louis introduced his conception of ‘your person’ as 
being more, or perhaps other than, just a body. In doing so, Louis’ differentiation of 
‘person’ from ‘body’ aligned with the Deleuzean notion of difference as a ‘positive 
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force of differentiation and transformation’ (Lenz Taguchi, 2012: 269). Louis was 
instantly resistant to being reduced to just a body and, within the limits of his 
language resources, identified his ‘person’, as being productively other than his 
‘body’ alone. 
 
Benjamin [aged 11], during his interview, recalled an incident when his class was 
learning about puberty. Benjamin had used his pre-existing knowledge to draw a 
picture of ‘a man’s lower part with hair around it’ to demonstrate his knowledge. This 
picture became a source of some amusement for the teacher, and apparent 
embarrassment for Benjamin. When recalling the situation and the context, Benjamin 
matter-of-factly announced that given the age and stage of his peer group, learning 
about puberty was highly appropriate. As Benjamin put it, ‘because we’re getting to 
that age where stuff kicks in’. This time, our interviewer was not so disarmed, and 
endorsed Benjamin’s claim: 
  
‘Stuff kicks in. Yeah, for sure’. 
 
This succinct statement from Benjamin also took up residence in a new recess in our 
cabinet of curiosities when we re-engaged with the transcript data further for this 
paper. ‘Stuff kicks in’. It is hard to imagine a more pithy encapsulation of the myriad 
experiences, emotions, developments, encounters, sensations, impulses, desires, 
reactions, thoughts, eruptions, dreams, phantasies, murmurings and exchanges that 
become entangled and equally, entangle the process of becoming both during puberty, 
and beyond. Benjamin’s phrase was comprehensive in its reach, while at the same 
time issuing a cautionary note to anyone wanting to break down or compartmentalise 
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all the ‘stuff’ and its processes. Nevertheless, when puberty is taught in schools and at 
home, this is what tends to happen. Bodies go through changes which usually bring 
accompanying changes in how we feel. A small concession to the integrity of 
bodymind perhaps, but the body is usually then separated and broken up into various 
systems (e.g. skeletal, endocrinal, reproductive-sexual), as is the mind (new ways of 
thinking, cognising, relating). None of this comes close to the scope and sweep of 
Benjamin’s statement, which is replete with dynamism and implicitly allows for 
variation, difference and differentiation, uncertainty, flux and change. In either an 
educational or familial context, Benjamin’s words could act as a motif and catalyst for 
promoting non-binary, complex, intra-active ways of thinking and hence, knowing. 
 
As is evident from the above commentary, we were ‘enchanted’ (Hultman & Lenz 
Taguchi, 2010: 540) by Benjamin’s comment. We then wondered (MacLure, 2013a) 
about Benjamin’s reference to ‘a man’s lower part’. The comment had been passed 
over in earlier coding as seemingly insignificant and without import. However, when 
we allowed it to sit again, yet differently, in our cabinet of curiosities, the reference 
invited closer consideration. It appears that Benjamin had picked up on discourses 
referring to the genitalia as private parts, and the body as having upper and lower 
sections. The folly of such arbitrary and artificial dichotomies is revealed sharply in 
Benjamin’s creation of ‘a man’s lower part’. We know what meaning Benjamin most 
likely intended by this reference, and mightn’t have otherwise stopped to think more 
on it, except that we had become interested in thinking other-wise. Once we did, we 
awoke to the fact that men do not have an equivalent ‘upper part’ and hence, the 
whole schema had to be called into question. We came to regard the reference to ‘a 
man’s lower part’ as a slippage. As such, it then presented as the obstacle necessary to 
 17 
diffract our thinking from its conventional path, and to permit other possibilities for 
bodymind being and becoming. These possibilities exist outside, or beyond the norms 
and restrictions established by dichotomies of upper/lower, part/whole, and even 
private/public. It was the seemingly very minor and unremarkable qualities to 
Benjamin’s reference that provided us with an opening towards some different 
meaning that mattered, and some matter that meant something other than what 
conventional biological discourse suggested. 
 
Further points of difference 
One further example relates to a fragment of data provided by April [aged 12]. In 
response to the standard invitation to find four words to describe a healthy body, April 
replied, 
‘Nourished’, to which the interviewer responded, 
‘Great word’. 
April then continued, 
‘Fit, healthy, and special’. 
On this occasion, our interviewer considered April’s word choice worthy of 
acknowledgement and amplification. ‘Nourished’ suggests possible engagement with 
the discourse of nutrition that April may well have picked up either at school, home, 
or the wider community. Along with the resonance of a healthy eating discourse, 
‘nourished’ also has wider and deeper connotations of nurturing, enriching, 
enlivening, motivating, valuing and even cherishing [Latin nutrire]. These qualities, 
while being anchored in the material practices of food consumption and exercise, 
simultaneously suggest an intersection and overlay with emotional, interpersonal, 
even spiritual dimensions. A healthy body may well be one that is suitably 
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‘nourished’, but we needed to think more, differently, and other-wise about some of 
the hidden connotations of this word. The point to make is that ‘nourished’ permits 
entanglements that subvert conventional boundaries and binaries. While our 
interviewer acknowledged and praised the potency of the word, we returned and re-
searched this extract with a diffractive mode of thinking in order to appreciate more 
fully why it was (felt by the interviewer to be) such a ‘great word’ to choose. 
The process generated a similar outcome in relation to April’s equating a healthy 
body with being ‘special’. By allowing this word to diffract or break away from our 
conventional understanding, we realised that ‘special’ is a bold statement about the 
natural form and beauty of the species [Latin specialis]. Of all the possible words 
April could have chosen, she found ‘special’ as one of four that suitably expressed her 
feeing and understanding of what a healthy body meant to her. In doing so, April was 
announcing something about the magnitude of a healthy body, re-membering and re-
minding us how it inheres in our very species. Our interviewer requested April 
elaborate on what she meant: 
Interviewer: ‘Special-that’s interesting, what do you mean?’ 
April: ‘Different, you know, not the same as everyone else. Different’. 
Interviewer: ‘Yeah, interesting. Okay’. 
On first reading, we saw April as making a statement about her uniqueness or desire 
to be recognised as such. On further and closer examination of this curiosity however, 
we started to see and hear other things going on. For April, a healthy body equalled 
‘different’, and ‘different’ meant ‘not the same as everyone else’. She added 
rhetorical force with her ‘you know’, and gave further weight to her statement by 
repeating ‘different’ at the other end of her reply. As such, it is difference that 
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bookends her explanation of what she means by ‘special’, inhering and entangled in 
her species, thereby invoking the speciality of her species, and her species-ness. This 
kind of difference is a very positive, productive difference, one that generates actions, 
intra-action, and qualities that are ‘not the same as everyone else’. Perhaps not the 
same as anyone else either? 
The more we allowed this response to break away from, and overlap with its implied 
and possible meanings, the clearer it became to us that April was incorporating [Latin 
incorprare] herself in her answer, while at the same time highlighting the value of a 
diffractive methodology. In this response, we could simultaneously see an instance of 
the spontaneous irruption of a materio-discursive truth about April, her species 
commonality/common speciality, and a way of letting this truth speak through her, 
and be heard. It was only be allowing these data fragments to sit/recess differently, 
that our curiosity could also square up with the data-fragment in previously un-
thought ways. 
 
Continuing thoughts 
As researchers, the challenge for us was to yield to our ‘perplexity’ (MacLure, 2013b: 
662) in favour of reading the data more as sense-event in which language remains, in 
the process, ‘non-representational, non-interpretive, a-signifying, a-subjective, 
paradoxical and embroiled with matter’ (p. 663). This approach might smack of 
primordial soup if MacLure didn’t also stress ‘the fact that language is in and of the 
body; always issuing from the body; being impeded by the body; affecting other 
bodies’ (p.663-4). To which we might usefully add that not only does language issue 
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from the material body, but that same body or bodymind, can also shape, limit, bend, 
impede and extend the matter of language. 
 
Barad (2010) also makes an important qualifying point in relation to entanglements, 
suggesting that they are ‘not a name for the interconnectedness of all being as one, but 
rather specific material relations of the ongoing differentiation of the world’ (p. 265). 
The notion of entanglement is adopted by Lenz Taguchi when articulating a 
diffractive and Deleuzean approach to analysing research data.  Lenz Taguchi’s 
(2012) interest is, in part, to permit more engagement from, and insinuation of the 
researcher’s bodymind, along with other animate and inanimate matter, in the process 
of diffractive processing. While taking a lead from this approach, we became more 
focused on identifying ways in which the bodymind and already-entangled material 
realities of the subjects irrupted through some of the language they used in response 
to questions about themselves, health and bodies.  
 
We assumed the role of what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) referred to as ‘becoming 
minoritarian’ (p. 106) wherein our commitment was to ‘thinking otherwise and away 
from norms and rigid power-producing habits of thinking by ways of new encounters 
and engagements’ (Lenz Taguchi, 2012: 272). Through this process, we found 
ourselves ‘being used by thought’ (Lather, 2013: 639), rather than having to do the 
thinking in order to make meaning. Being used by thought meant having to resist 
succumbing to our established ways of framing, viewing, analysing and theorising 
research data; it meant being prepared to yield to the discomforts that accompanied 
‘not knowing’ and ‘not understanding; it meant opening ourselves to the prospect of 
certain meanings, even truths, being hidden or entangled within fragments of data that 
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had not revealed themselves using our established methodological tools, and that had 
left us on the verge of ‘closing the book’ on the data.  
Being used by thought also meant assuming a different onto-epistemological stance in 
relation to the data fragments, inviting them to open us up to what they still had to 
say. This required us to stay and work with the process long enough for the resistance 
in the data (but equally in our researcher-selves) to loosen up and break down 
sufficiently, to then permit some fresh and different insights to emerge. Furthermore, 
this stance permitted an ethical component, in that our diffractive approach allowed 
some continuous respect to be shown towards what the children had said in the 
interviews. This kind of re-spect, this way of looking back, looking again, looking 
differently [Latin respectus] turned out to honour more fully some things the children 
had said, but also, perhaps, the way they experienced themselves in the world, by 
resisting, being and acting beyond binaries (intra-acting); embracing and embodying 
difference; entangled in worlds that do not readily separate what they think, from how 
they feel, from what they say, from what they eat, from how they look, to how they 
communicate. In this way too, the fundamentally ethical impulses driving Barad’s 
(2007, 2010) project came into fuller light. 
 
Conclusion 
The demonstration of diffractive processing offered in this paper points to some 
possible ways in which thinking, and being thought differently, can work to disrupt 
habitual modes of hearing and seeing research data, with the accompanying biases 
and blinkers that these habits often entail. The need for caution and concern has been 
identified previously by feminist post-structuralist scholars researching the field of 
eating disorders (e.g. Malson, 1998; Malson and Burns, 2009). However these 
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accounts have focused more on critiques of the existing socio-cultural conditions and 
the ‘violences of pathologicalisation’ (Malson and Burns, 2009: 4) that are embedded 
in the responses to, and treatments of the condition, especially for women.  Little 
attention has been given to younger populations afflicted with eating disorders, nor 
what they have to say for/about themselves. 
 
While we had largely dismissed the data as unrevealing and insignificant in relation to 
our inquiries into gender, bodies, and health, a few fragments ‘productively puzzled’ 
us (Dyke, 2013: 161). The disruption of categories based around traditional binaries 
was one particularly noteworthy effect of this process, especially the classic 
mind/body split, but also the physical/mental, upper/lower, part/whole dichotomies. 
We realised that some of the nuances and implications of this shadowy knowledge 
can be overlooked or dismissed, either when coding for certain established nodes or 
themes, or when seeking to represent/interpret data within a given analytic 
framework. MacLure (2013c) noted the tendency within coding to ‘take you “away” 
from the data-from their detail, complexity, singularity’ (p. 169). 
 
Lenz Taguchi (2010) argued that diffractive thinking ‘requires us to engage in an 
event of reading and becoming-with the data’ (p. 272, italics in original). Through our 
examples it is possible to see the subtle yet problematic ways in which language, 
thought and matter operate to both expand and restrict our ability to account for lived, 
embodied experience. We re-routed some of our conventional ways of analysing and 
interpreting the research data in order to see/hear what else/other may have been lying 
in the cracks and recesses of both the transcript data and our thinking. Our small 
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examples point to the strength of such an approach, the main aim being to ‘give a 
[new or different] direction’ to thinking (Mazzei, 2013: 108).  
 
Methodologically, rather than turning in any one direction towards language, or 
materiality, or bodies, we found ourselves re-turning differently/diffractively to the 
data, and allowing the data to re-turn itself differently to us. Most notably, we became 
more keenly aware of tendencies in our approach to data collection, coding, and 
analysis that unconsciously reproduced and perpetuated some of the problematic 
binaries that have long inhabited and haunted western discourse. By the end of our re-
search, it was apparent that diffractive modes of thinking and analysis invite and 
permit different and unintended outcomes and possibilities for qualitative inquiry. We 
were buoyed by the insights and possibilities generated by small shifts in the way we 
approached and thought about our data. We remain encouraged by our discoveries to 
pursue further explorations and incursions into and through these methodological 
hinterlands, and beyond to the fresh epistemological, ontological and ethical vistas 
they open up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
References 
Author C and other (2009) details withheld for peer review 
Author B and C (2013) details withheld for peer review 
Author B and other (2014) details withheld for peer review 
Author C B and other (2014) details withheld for peer review 
Barad KM (2007) Meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the 
entanglement of matter and meaning. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Barad KM (2010) Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of 
Inheritance: Dis/continuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings and Justice-to-Come. Derrida 
Today 3(2): 240-268. 
Barad K (2012) Interview with Karen Barad. In R Dolphijn and I van der Tuin (eds). 
New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: 
Open Humanities Press, 48-70. 
Braidotti R (2013) The Posthuman. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Carroll L (1983) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. 
Harmondsworth Middlesex: Puffin Books. 
Coleman R and Ringrose J (eds) (2013) Deleuze and Research Methodologies. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 25 
Deleuze G (1993) The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque. London: The Athlone Press. 
Deleuze G and Guattari F (1988) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Translation and Foreword by Brian Massumi. London: Continuum. 
Grosz E (2010) The Untimeliness of Feminist Theory. NORA-Nordic Journal of 
Feminist and Gender Research 18(1): 48-51. 
Hultman K and Lenz Taguchi H (2010) Challenging anthropocentric analysis of 
visual data: A relational materialist methodological approach to educational research. 
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 23(5): 525-542. 
Jackson AY and Mazzei LA (2012) Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research. 
Viewing data across multiple perspectives. Oxon: Routledge. 
Jackson AY and Mazzei LA (2013) Plugging One Text Into Another: Thinking With 
Theory in Qualitative Research Qualitative Inquiry 19 (4): 261-271 
Juelskjaer M (2013) Gendered subjectivities of spacetimematter. Gender and 
Education 25(6): 754-768. 
Lather P (2013) Methodology-21: what do we do in the afterward? International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 26(6): 634-645. 
Lather P and St. Pierre EA (2013) Post-qualitative research. International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies in Education 26(6): 629-633. 
Lenz Taguchi H (2010) Going beyond the theory/practice divide in early childhood 
education: introducing an intra-active pedagogy. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Lenz Taguchi H (2012) A diffractive and Deleuzian approach to analysing interview 
data. Feminist Theory 13(3): 265-281. 
 26 
Lykke N (2010) The Timeliness of Post-Constructionism. NORA-Nordic Journal of 
Feminist and Gender Research 18(2): 131-136. 
MacLure M (2006) The bone in the throat: some uncertain thoughts on baroque 
method. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 19(6): 729-745. 
MacLure M, Holmes R, Jones L. and MacRae, C (2010) Silence as Resistance to 
Analysis: Or, or Not Opening One’s Mouth Properly. Qualitative Inquiry 16(6): 492-
500. 
MacLure M (2011) Qualitative Inquiry: Where Are the Ruins? Qualitative Inquiry 
17(10): 997-1005. 
MacLure M (2013a). The Wonder of Data. Cultural Studies <> Critical 
Methodologies 13(4): 228-232. 
MacLure M (2013b) Researching without representation: Language and materiality in 
post-qualitative methodology. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in 
Education 26(6): 658-667. 
MacLure M (2013c) Classification or Wonder? Coding as an Analytic Practice in 
Qualitative Research. In: Coleman R and Ringrose J (eds.) Deleuze and Research 
Methodologies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 164-183. 
Malson H (1998) The Thin Woman. Feminism, post-structuralism and the social 
psychology of anorexia nervosa. London: Routledge. 
Malson H and Burns M (2009) Re-theorising the slash of dis/order: An introduction to 
critical feminist approaches to eating dis/orders. In: Malson H and Burns M (eds) 
Critical Feminist Approaches to Eating Dis/Orders. London: Routledge, 1-6. 
 27 
Marks J (1997) Deleuze and literature: Metaphor and indirect discourse, Social 
Semiotics 7(2): 233-246. 
Mazzei LA (2013) Desire Undone: Productions of Privilege, Power and Voice. In: 
Coleman R and Ringrose J (eds) Deleuze and Research Methodologies. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 96-110. 
Merrell F (2003) Sensing corporeally: toward a posthuman understanding. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Patton P (1997) The World Seen From Within. Theory & Event 1(1): 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.1patton.html 
Reid CL (1995) The Free Voice. A Guide to Natural Singing. New York: Joseph 
Patelson Music House. 
Taylor CA and Ivinson G (2013) Material feminisms: new directions for education. 
Gender and Education, 25(6): 665-670. 
 
 
